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Introduction 
It is an honor for our organization, Asociación Servicios de Promoción Laboral 
(ASEPROLA), to have been considered to conduct the investigation denominated 
IMPROVING SOCIAL PROTECTION IN THE APPAREL AND FOOTWEAR 
INDUSTRY, investigation conducted in Central America for the Fair Labor Association 
(FLA). 
The investigation formulates, together with a series of critical opinions of the system that is 
behind the maquila industry in Central America, a series of proposals to improve the 
conditions of workers. 
The work focuses on technical proposals for social protection originating from government 
sectors and from worker organizations -- including some proposals to which employers are 
sympathetic – but goes beyond to investigate countries beyond the target area and even 
from other latitudes in order to consider ways to improve the practice of compliance with 
labor rights.  
It is clear that a new global articulation in the manufacture of garments and clothing has 
taken a different direction from that when the Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA) existed, 
which assigned, so to speak, production quotas by region and by country. Today, 6 years 
after its end, we can observe more clearly what had been projected with regard to how 
global textile activity would change.  
The expiry of the MFA would cause problems in countries where large companies decided 
to relocate and in those from which they withdrew, especially when global conditions for 
openness, made countries with depressed economies opt for public policies that attracted 
foreign direct investment, such was the case of Central America.  
This investigation seeks to identify adequate social protection measures for workers, as it is 
likely that the MFA may be contributing, directly or indirectly, to the gradual loss of rights 
on the part of workers.  
The first chapter provides a general context of the region in terms of employment structure 
and how public policy has incentivized the model of free zones and the effects of the zones. 
It also shows in tabular form the worker rights that are guaranteed in the region and who is 
responsible for providing such protection and tutelage. In addition, the wage structure is 
discussed, in order to compare the cost of termination with other world locations. Finally, it 
presents some options to compensate workers. 
The second chapter presents protection options arising from the private sector.   
Unavoidably, a the issues at hand involve three parties, the State and workers also 
participate, but we have chosen to name them as such, since the crucial driving force for 
them comes from the private sector within the work triad.  
For each initiative, constructed based on ASEPROLA’s experience combined with 
consultation with the sectors and with country experiences, pros, cons and conditions for its 
operation, including some positions of the work team, are included.  
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Chapter three, which sets out the possible initiatives arising from the public sector, is 
perhaps the vital element in the report.  These initiatives are likely to generate a great deal 
of discussion and, most probably counterproposals from persons and organizations that 
may publicly debate this document. 
Chapters four and five reflect our ethical commitment, as during the interviews comments 
and criticisms of the production model arose, especially calls to global brands who produce 
in Central America and to Governments who promote a policy of attracting direct 
investment via free zones.  While these are not technical comments and are more in the 
political realm, we believe that they could be part of a future discussion or of the current 
debate regarding the system underlying production of textiles and garments. 
Were we to ignore this and leave it for discussion at a later time, we would not be reflecting 
the views presented by the individuals and the social and union organizations that provided 
us with logistical support and shared their knowledge with us. 
Finally we present some conclusions to be considered during the discussion of the report, 
expecting that it generate many and positive reactions.  
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1. Context 
1.1. General Context in Central America 
Data for Central America and the Dominican Republic indicate that, as of 2007, 
employment in the maquila industry represented 500,000 direct jobs, with more than 808 
companies involved (IRSTD 2007).   
In the countries targeted for this research (Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras and 
Nicaragua) a 20% decrease in employment is estimated in this sector during the last three 
years, caused by the financial crisis in the United States and an increased shift of this 
industry to Asian countries. However, the governments of the countries under investigation 
are continuing to struggle to preserve and promote this activity, given the very limited 
progress they have made in attracting other forms of capital investment that would absorb 
such high levels of the economically active population and contribute greater value added 
to gross domestic product.  
The textile maquila contributes little to value added as – for example – its contribution in 
Honduras represents 6% of the value added to GDP, while in the other countries 
(Guatemala, El Salvador and Nicaragua) it represents in the order of between 1% and 3%  
(The State of the Region, UNDP, 2007).     
Despite this, the textile maquila (and to a lesser degree the footwear maquila) are still 
important contributors to the economies of the countries being analyzed, which is 
troublesome due to the tendency of these governments to be permissive with investors in 
these areas, especially with regards to labor and environmental responsibilities.  
In 2010, Honduras approved a law that allows a salary below the minimum wage, if 
companies locate in very economically depressed geographical zones.  
This initiative motivates other countries to promote similar measures: for example, in El 
Salvador, manufacturers in free zones advocate for more flexible legislation with respect to 
labor for the maquila sector, focusing on changes to work shift hours that practically 
eliminate overtime payments.  Likewise, in Guatemala, employers seek changes to the 
current free zone laws in favor of more permissive and lower fiscal requirements.  
It is clear that globally there is a “race to the bottom”, as stated by the International Clean 
Clothes Campaign initiative (Merk, 2009) in its analysis of the textile maquila in Asia. That 
is, the international maquila industry is highly competitive, with capital coming and going 
where fiscal and labor conditions are lower, and this seems to justify some business 
attitudes, especially with regards to labor responsibilities,  although this industry never in 
its history has been characterized for its good practices in this field. This challenge has 
transcended the national level.  It is not only the attitude and policies of one country that 
tilts the balance – for example, the China factor; it is a value chain that flows 
internationally following a hegemonic logic of actors, in which the brands and retailers hold 
a privileged positions and impose their conditions.  
Faced with this situation, we ask ourselves, as the situation stands, is enforcing compliance 
with labor rights a way to drive away investment in the maquila industry within a country? 
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The answer is: it is a risk, but the race to the bottom must be pushed in the opposite 
direction.  Many efforts in Asia and Latin America are aimed at doing so.  Merely applying 
existing labor rights is a method of achieving this.  A political decision by the actors in the 
value chain would suffice for things to change for the better.  
One of the ways to mitigate the “race to the bottom” would be for maquila-promoting 
countries to at least comply with labor obligations. In Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras 
and Nicaragua, labor movements historically achieved legislation that protected labor and 
the state sided with workers in confronting employers.    
1.2. Rights covered in the case of dismissal without just cause in Central America.  
For the purpose of this study, the legal procedures that apply when a maquila enterprise 
shuts down are denominated “contract termination without just cause.” The legal 
jurisprudence has determined that the closing of an enterprise is not as a result of a cause 
attributable to the worker,  Therefore, it is the employer that dissolves the labor contract, 
regardless of the cause that led to the company closure.  
Even though, in principle, the employer has the freedom of contract, it is conditioned upon 
the obligation to indemnify workers, given that the right of the employer could result in 
harm to the interests of workers.      
Legislation in all of the countries analyzed include a range of benefits for workers in the 
case of termination without just cause.  Variations from country to country are not 
significant, as shown by the following table: 
 
Table 1: Rights covered under termination without just cause 
By country  
By type of right1 
 
Rights Guatemala El Salvador Honduras Nicaragua 
Christmas Bonus or 
Thirteenth month. 
(*) 
Legally a part of the 
company’s financial 
liability.  It is a 
responsibility of the 
State to guard this 
worker entitlement.  
Proportional to the 
date of dismissal, 
between January 1st 
of the previous year 
and December 31st of 
the current year. 
Proportional to the 
date of dismissal, 
following these 
guidelines: 
-1 to 3 years: 10 days 
of wages. 
- 3 to 10 years: 15 
days. 
- More than 10 years: 
18 days. 
Proportional to the 
date of dismissal, 
between January 1st 
of the previous year 
and December 31st of 
the current year. 
Proportional to the 
date of dismissal, 
between January 1st 
of the previous year 
and November 30th.  
  
                                                          
1
 Rights with (*) are inalienable rights. 
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Rights Guatemala El Salvador Honduras Nicaragua 
Bonuses 
Bonus 14 or 
Fourteenth month 
(*) 
Incentive bonus. 
 
Legally a part of the 
company’s financial 
liability.  It is a 
responsibility of the 
State to guard this 
worker entitlement.  
Bonus 14: Additional 
payment of one 
ordinary salary 
(100%) for each year 
or fraction thereof, 
worked for a single 
employer, paid 
during the first half 
of July. 
Incentive bonus: 
Payment of Q.250 
quetzals agreed upon 
by the parties to be 
paid along with the 
monthly wages.  
Not applicable Fourteenth:   Social 
compensation paid 
during the month of 
June each year. It 
corresponds to a 
payment of 100% of 
the salary, without 
social contributions.  
A year of service is 
calculated between 
July 1st and June 30th 
of the following year.  
Not applicable. 
Vacation Pay (*). 
 
Legally a part of the 
company’s financial 
liability.  It is a 
responsibility of the 
State to guard this 
worker entitlement.  
Corresponding to 
vacations not taken. 
Vacation pay is the 
wages of 15 days, in 
addition to a 30% 
surcharge.  Within a 
year, a proportional 
payment is made 
corresponding to 
vacations not taken at 
the time of dismissal. 
If the worker has not 
taken any vacations 
during the year, a 
complete payment is 
made.   
Corresponding to 
vacations not taken. 
Corresponding to 
vacations not taken. 
Indemnity or 
severance (*) 
 
Legally a part of the 
company’s financial 
liability.  It is a 
responsibility of the 
State to guard this 
worker entitlement.  
Equivalent to a 
month’s salary for 
each year of 
continuous service. If 
a year of service is 
not completed, then 
the proportional 
amount. The 
reference monthly 
salary is based on the 
salaries for the last 
six months. 
. 
One monthly salary 
for each year of 
service plus an 
amount for any 
fraction of the 
incomplete last year. 
If less than a year of 
service, a 
proportional amount 
that cannot be less 
than 15 days is paid. 
The reference 
monthly salary is 
based on the salaries 
for the last six 
months. 
 
Severance benefit:  
10 days of wages, if 
worked 3 but less 
than 6 months; 20 
days of wages, if 
worked 6 months to 
less than one year; 1 
month for each year 
worked, and 
proportional for 
fraction of a year.  
The maximum for the 
severance benefit is 
15 months. 
 
Seniority 
compensation: 
For the first three 
years, one month’s 
wages for each year 
or corresponding 
fraction worked.  For 
4 to 6 years, right to 
20 days of wages for 
each year of service 
or fraction.  From the 
7th year of service 
forward, it does not 
continue, as the 
maximum 
compensation is 5 
months of salary. 
  
 Asociación Servicios de Promoción Laboral - ASEPROLA  
 
9 
 
Rights Guatemala El Salvador Honduras Nicaragua 
Notice 
It is the obligation of 
the parts to inform 
within reasonable 
time, the cessation of 
work.  If a worker 
does not provide 
notice, jurisprudence 
interprets this is as 
abandonment of 
work and the 
employer may apply 
justified termination. 
  
Where this 
entitlement exists, it 
is the responsibility 
of the State to guard 
its application. 
Notice is a right of 
the employer and its 
object is to provide 
the employer a period 
of time during which 
the worker hands 
over the position 
and/or trains a person 
to occupy the 
position.  
 
The worker must 
communicate the 
intent to resign in 
writing or verbally (if 
two witnesses are 
present) according to 
the following table:  
6 months of 
continuous service, 
one week of advance 
notice. 
After six months of 
continuous service, 
but less than one 
year, ten days of 
advanced notice.  
After one year of 
continuous service, 
but less than five 
years, two weeks’ 
notice. 
After five years of 
continuous service, at 
least one month’s 
advance notice. 
If the worker does 
not comply with the 
advanced notice, the 
worker must 
compensate the 
employer. 
The notice takes the 
form of a monetary 
indemnity only in the 
case of contracts for a 
determinate amount 
of time or by job.  
Whether the 
employee or the 
employer decided to 
rescind the work 
contract, it must be 
communicated 
according to the 
following:  
24 hours’ notice for 
less than 3 months of 
service.  
1 week for 6 months 
to one year of 
service.  
1 month for 1 to 2 
years.  
Two months for more 
than 2 years of 
service.  
When the worker is 
terminated and no 
advance notice is 
given, severance 
must be calculated 
according to seniority 
calculations. 
Notice does not exist; 
it was replaced by 
seniority 
compensation. 
 
It is important to point out that in the case of “termination with just cause”, that is, when 
the reason for termination is among those included in the law as a cause attributable to the 
worker and punishable, the employer is not obligated to pay indemnity or severance, but 
must meet all benefits of Christmas bonuses, vacations, bonuses and wages owed at the 
time of dismissal. 
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The obligations are set out in the Labor Code of each of the countries and it is the 
responsibility of the State, through its Labor Departments, to ensure that they are 
obeyed. Faced with employer non-compliance, workers must turn to Labor Inspectorate to 
present a complaint; this entity will attempt to mediate with the employer to enforce the 
worker’s rights.  Otherwise there are other judicial means, like labor tribunals to present 
claims.  This institutional framework does not work efficiently, as there are a series of 
obstacles to providing labor justice effectively, promptly and timely, in part because of the 
fear on the part of workers of repercussions for activating the judicial labor system, as well 
as for its economic costs.  The institutional obstacles are possibly the most significant 
(IRSTD, 2007), ranging from lack of jurisdiction to corrupt behavior of authorities.  
The sudden closure of an enterprise, particularly when this is done without meeting its 
obligations to provide benefits, is a complex situation, given that generally maquilas do not 
have assets to seize. The structures where the maquila operates often is leased from the free 
zone corporations; machinery is leased from a third party; and the goods being produced 
(manufactured) do not generally belong to the maquila employer but rather to the company 
requesting the service, generally a subcontractor or a brand if it is a direct contract. Under 
these circumstances, there is little to seize to meet the benefits owed to affected workers, 
although, the law establishes that in the case of closure or bankruptcy, worker claims have 
payment priority. 
In addition, termination costs are internationally high compared to the average in Asia. 
According to the World Bank (Doing Business Report 2010) the cost of termination 
calculated in weekly salaries is an average of 62.9 weekly salaries for Latin America and 
the Caribbean, compared with 44.2 weekly salaries for East Asia and the Pacific region it is 
44.2 weekly salaries. 
In the countries analyzed, the cost of termination is: 
 Guatemala 101 weekly salaries. 
 Honduras 95 weekly salaries. 
 El Salvador 86 weekly salaries. 
 Nicaragua 23.5 weekly salaries. 
While in some Asian countries: 
 India  79 weekly salaries. 
 Singapore 4 weekly salaries. 
 Thailand 47 weekly salaries. 
Vietnam 98 weekly salaries. 
Malaysia 65.2 weekly salaries.   
Taking into consideration minimum wages, in countries such as India, Sri Lanka, Vietnam, 
Pakistan and Cambodia, the minimum wage is below or in the vicinity of the poverty 
threshold established by the United Nations of 2 to 4 dollars a day (Merk, 2009), while the 
minimum wage in the analyzed Central America countries is between 7 and 8 dollars a day.   
The above data are often used by businessmen, economists and politicians in Central 
America to argue for greater labor flexibility, not only in the maquila industry but also in 
the general production of goods and services.   Other opinion groups in the region speak of 
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the diversification of the maquila industry (following the examples of Costa Rica and 
Panama), striving for greater efficiency and competitiveness. However, in Central America, 
as much as in Asia, the right thing to do is to halt the “race to the bottom” affecting the 
textile and footwear industries worldwide.  
Finally, it should be noted that any proposal promoting a more effective access to worker 
benefits is likely to create a pool of funds that might be a significant
2
 and could create 
economic benefits to the countries.  
1.3.The structure of the labor market. 
The population of Central America is approximately 39 million, divided almost evenly 
between men and women. Of the almost 26 million people of economically active age, only 
14 million people work, 10 million men and 4 million women.  
The economically active population in Central America consists of 51% women and 49% 
men; hence female employment is 33% while male employment is 67%.  
The textile sector in Central America provides 425 thousand jobs, of which 75% are jobs 
filled by women. 
The salary structure in Central America ranges from $133 dollars to $284
3
 dollars; the 
following table shows this structure for the countries analyzed:  
 
Country Average wage for 
maquila 
(in USD) 
Approximate number of workers 
for the sector 2/ 
El Salvador 173.70 100,000 
Guatemala 250.00 92,000 
Honduras 215.00 110,000 
Nicaragua 133.00 90,000 
  
In general terms, workers in this sector can be characterized as follows: generally a young 
person, between the ages of 18 and 35 years, poorly educated, poorly trained for the job, 
required to perform multi-functions, living under conditions where salary is spent almost 
immediately, without the ability to save. Generally unaware -- due to a low educational 
level -- of worker rights, and in some cases, has no knowledge about the collective defense 
of these rights.  
This explanation is important, as it describes the panorama, in addition to other points made 
earlier, through which any proposal for protection will have to go through in Central 
America.  
 
 
                                                          
2
 According to the newspaper “El Financiero” from Costa Rica, the Labor Capitalization Fund in Costa Rica in July of 
2010 reached $624,000,000.00. http://www.elfinancierocr.com/ef_archivo/2010/septiembre/05/finanzas2494992.html 
3
 Salary for this sector in Costa Rica. 
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1.4. Other options in addition to severance payment, to extend social protection for 
workers  
a. Private unemployment insurance (paid for by the employer)  
Unemployment insurance is a fund to which three parties contribute (workers, employers 
and the State).  In Latin American countries such as Brazil and Uruguay, unemployment 
insurance systems are administered by the state, while in Chile they are operated by a 
mixed private and state system.  
The worker generally has access to the fund for a period of six months, a reasonable time to 
find other employment. The amount received is no less than 50% to 60% of the wages 
earned prior to unemployment 
In Mexico, the employer obtains an insurance policy from an insurance company in the 
name of each of its workers, in the form of individual accounts.  It is also a temporary and 
limited system, as it does not replace the full wage (prior to unemployment), and therefore, 
it is a form of temporary subsidy. This is a characteristic of unemployment insurance 
systems.   
Unemployment insurance systems do not exist in Central America.  However, Severance 
Funds (in Costa Rica and Panama) are considered a type of worker insurance against 
unemployment.     
In the countries analyzed, only in Guatemala was there a draft law identified to create a 
tripartite unemployment insurance system, Initiative Number 4036 “Regulatory Law for the 
National Program for Unemployment Insurance and Employment Promotion”, which 
would allow workers who lost their job without just cause, or who request a termination of 
contract for causes attributable to the employer, to receive for up to six months or until 
other employment is found the equivalent of 60% of the average salary for the last year 
(this benefit could never be lower than the minimum wage).  
The ILO has pointed out that in Latin America, unemployment insurance systems are 
limited to a few countries and to formal employees, who are generally less than 35% of the 
Economically Active Population. However, the greatest concern regarding this form of 
insurance is its lack of solvency in the face of cyclical employment crisis and the low rate 
of return of the fund in these instances to cover future demand due to increasing numbers of 
eligible workers.  This concern stems from the experiences in Europe and the United States, 
during prolonged periods of labor market crisis, when funds have become near bankrupt 
and unable to cover the population requesting it.  
Some regional private banks offer a type of unemployment insurance, which workers can 
obtain individually and voluntarily, to cover payment of a worker’s debts (mortgage, bank 
loans, payment of service such as education).  This service is evidently aimed at the 
professional sector.  
b. Private sector defined contributions (similar to 401K)  
This type of insurance policy, used to build retirement funds and promoted by companies, 
is not seen in the region, particularly in the countries analyzed.  Furthermore, we have not 
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identified any initiatives of this nature formulated by companies or by workers.  The closest 
to this type of retirement fund in the region is found in Costa Rica, where the law – 
Solidarity Law – allowed employers to transfer severance funds to these structures for their 
administration and investment. However, the moneys came from severance funds and not 
from additional contributions or from an agreement with workers to deduct certain amounts 
from their salaries to create the aforesaid alternative retirement funds.  
The administration of funds by solidarista associations was weakened by the approval of 
the Law for Worker Protection 7983, issued February 16, 2000, which created labor 
capitalization funds, that collect 3% of gross severance on behalf of workers. 
An issue with 401 K type contributions is the level of worker salaries in Central America, 
which scarcely are sufficient to purchase the basic food basket. It would be beneficial to 
conduct in depth analysis to determine if, under such precarious conditions, it would be 
possible for workers to allocate funds for this purpose, which we find doubtful.  
The closest example of what we could call unemployment benefit occurred in a 
maquiladora in Nicaragua where, not during a closure but during a temporary cessation of 
operations, the company, notwithstanding that the law allowed the company to stop 
payment of wages to maquila workers, “decided” to maintain payment of minimum wage 
during the shutdown – an isolated and responsible case – although the law indicates that 
during a shutdown, workers shall not receive wages. 
c. Examples of any other models from other industries in any country   
We have found few if any examples of this situation.  What we find in cases of some 
closures – and there are not too many examples – are companies and brands that faced with 
great national and international pressure agree to a remediation process to address 
irresponsible closures, with brands assuming part of the responsibility.  Examples such as 
those in Honduras (JERZEES) and Nicaragua (CALYPSO), demonstrate that that the 
remediation is conducted under pressure and not by free will. 
In Costa Rica, we have found within the instruments developed by INCAE (Central 
American Institute for Business Administration) and the Business Development 
Association (AED)
4
, indicators related to dismissals and mass layoffs.  These indicators are 
part of instruments developed in Costa Rica to evaluate enterprises with the objective of 
improving their corporate social responsibility.  We are not aware of whether this same 
methodology is used in other Central American countries and if so, whether the same 
indicators are used.  
This effort is interesting and within the mechanisms of Corporate Social Responsibility. A 
study conducted by the Regional Initiative for Social Responsibility and Decent Work 
(IRSTD) in 2007 shows that companies that are applying Corporate Social Responsibility 
Systems are domestic and powerful international companies, established under the national 
legal regime, rather than those operating under the free zone regime (maquilas).  
                                                          
4
 Costa Rica Social Business Responsibility Indicator Manual. 
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2. Social protection options offered by the private sector 
 
2.1. Guarantee policy  
This is a type of insurance; policies generally prevent a contingency such as losses (life 
insurance, accidents, health, theft, fire, etc.). 
 
Pros Cons Position of the consulting 
team 
Proposal conditions or 
considerations 
It can be appealing if 
employers are 
convinced that payment 
of a policy would be 
beneficial to them, as 
brands would 
increasingly use their 
services and 
governments will 
consider this initiative 
in terms of fiscal 
incentives. Some 
employers indicate that 
these types of actions 
should be recognized as 
part of corporate social 
responsibility and 
therefore, governments 
and brands should 
accordingly, 
reciprocate these 
actions.  
  
Because it deals with a 
productive sector known for 
poor worker rights practices 
by some employers, insurance 
companies might establish 
high premiums for this 
insurance. This would be an 
additional cost incurred by 
maquilas.  
Some employers maintain that 
requiring them to procure this 
insurance is tantamount to 
asserting that they will fail to 
comply with worker rights.  
This option is not functional 
because insurance is used to 
prevent a contingency such as 
covering losses (life 
insurance, accidents, health, 
theft, fire, etc.).  
Covering worker rights in 
case of closure is not a 
contingency.  It is a legal 
right. Promoting this approach 
could reaffirm the 
government’s inability to 
protect labor rights.  
Insurance should not be used 
to legitimize an unlawful, 
fraudulent closure. The 
contingency would not be the 
possible closure of the 
company, but the company’s 
failure to compensate workers 
(an illegal act).  Insurance is 
not designed to cover 
illegality, but to cope with 
losses. 
Each company should make 
the corresponding 
previsions, of an 
administrative and financial 
nature, to ensure the 
availability of funds to 
comply with labor-related 
obligations. A closure may, 
or may not occur, however, 
should it happen, the “loss” 
would be to defraud 
workers, an illegal act. 
Insurance is not designed to 
cover crimes. It should be 
applied in all Central 
American countries to avoid 
creating a competitive 
disadvantage for the 
country adopting this 
proposal. 
 
 
2.2. Contingency fund agreed upon by the parties  
It would be a “commitment” fund, agreed upon by the participants in the value chain.  
This initiative arose from the investigation team’s debate after observing the panorama and 
context under which this inquiry was conducted.  It would be utilized only in the case of 
illegal business closures of companies in free zones, which would make it a “solidarity” 
fund to act against corporate irresponsibility.  
It is based on three premises: 
A –  States have made the attraction of foreign direct investment into a public policy to 
mitigate unemployment through a policy of commercial openness upon which labor laws 
have been superimposed.  However, there are gaps in labor laws in the light of very 
aggressive free trade policies.  It seems to be the case that countries have not been able to 
improve or adapt labor laws and further that labor laws have not been enforced.  This has 
led to a competitive environment based on lowering labor costs. 
B – Companies not only take advantage of the fiscal benefits provided by the Free Trade 
Zone Laws for specific duration of time times, but also seek to improve their profits 
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through well-known methods, such as putting pressure to lower labor benefits 
environmental regulations, etc. 
C – Brands, seeking to place orders for their apparel products, take advantage of these 
developments to lower their costs, knowing that at times that laws as well as business 
practices are permissive and detrimental to workers.  
Therefore, each party forms a link, and in conjunction with the others, creates a value 
chain, where costs are subsumed and an adequate profit margin is sought for all parties. 
 
Pros Cons Position of the consulting 
team 
Proposal conditions or 
considerations 
In at least one country, 
government sectors were 
consulted, and they 
appeared to be 
“interested” in the 
proposal. 
It depends on the will of 
the participants of the 
value chain, given the 
demonstrated instability 
(widely acknowledged) 
of this type of production. 
It can provide increased 
peace of mind to workers 
and give parties an 
incentive to better inquire 
about the  type of 
company an agreement is 
bargained with, given that 
the proposal aims to 
provide support against 
“illegal” or sudden 
closures of factories, 
evolving into a safety 
mechanism to counter the 
same corporations or 
societies in the same 
country or other 
countries,. 
 
Persuading the brand – or 
brands – buying from the 
factory may prove 
difficult since sometimes 
the production contracts 
are for far too short a 
time to consider this type 
of fund.  
The same may be with 
respect to companies, 
who may interpret it as an 
offense, since they may 
see it as based on 
perceptions that they 
break the law with 
impunity.  
Design of the “solidarity” 
fund within a logic that  
protects individual 
investment and not joint 
investments.  
Persuading the State to 
guarantee a part of the 
would mean getting it to 
admit that there are 
shortcomings in its public 
policy regarding foreign 
direct investment, which 
would be a challenge.  
The “what” and the 
“how” the State will 
contribute to this fund 
will have to be 
determined. 
It is a “commitment” fund in 
which the three responsible 
parties, responding to 
adequate pressure and above 
all coordination with labor, 
can come to an agreement to 
create a contingency fund that 
supports workers and 
functions as a “responsible 
floor” to deal with the 
irresponsibility of a few. 
It does not guarantee 
compliance with rights; it only 
acts to address “illegal” 
contingency of some 
employers, but at least it 
protects with dignity the 
workers’ rights.  
We foresee tension with 
respect to how the fund is 
constructed, as the parties 
must agree on contributions 
based on forecast profits from 
the value chain, meaning a 
cost is to be incurred from the 
projected net profits after 
deducting inherent production 
costs. 
If agreed, the fund would be 
located in an organization 
inserted within the State 
(Labor Ministry or the 
social security system).  
Related to the value chain 
concept.  
Must cover at least two 
months of minimum wage for 
workers and assumes payment 
of all labor obligations owed. 
The average prescribed 
amount would correspond to 
the average number of 
employees in the textile and 
garment plants existing in free 
zones working with the 
brands willing to support it. 
Labor issues paid during a 
whole year plus two monthly 
base salaries, multiplied by 
the average number of 
employees working in the 
factories willing to 
participate; this would be the 
required amount, prorated 
among all the factories used 
by each brand..  
The state would guarantee 
that, at least during two 
months, workers have 
complete social security 
coverage, for each 
unemployed workers and their 
family. 
Evidently, the state would 
incur the greatest share of the 
cost in this chain.   
Formula for the contingency fund.     ExL1 + (Xt*µSM)
5
 
ExL1= payable labor benefits in a work year. 
Xt= Average number of workers at factories involved in the process. 
µ= number of months agreed to be kept as base salary (2 months?) 
SM: monthly base salary 
 
                                                          
5
 See attached Excel file containing an explanation of the creation of the Fund. 
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To calculate yearly labor benefits:  ExL1= Xt* (C+A+V+∑oe) n 
C= Severance 
A= Christmas bonus 
V= Vacations 
∑oe = sum of other labor benefits associated with the rights in the country, for example 14th bonus, education bonus, etc.. 
n= number of years proposed to be included in the fund – we suggest two years.
 
Contributions to the fund are divided into 50% for brands involved and 50% for businesses, 
prorated to brands and participating employers. The fund is created and funded directly 
with two years of owed labor obligations, according to the formula, and two months 
average worker base salaries for the average number of workers employed. Given the 
formula for calculating labor obligations owed, this will grow because of investment- this 
can be a trust opened with a public or private finance company. The State commits from 
one to three months full social security benefits for unemployed workers and their families, 
caused by the irresponsible business closure. 
The State, brands and other participating employers would put pressure on bad companies 
to return to withdrawn amounts to the fund, under penalty of grievance or elimination of 
orders to other companies belonging to the same corporation or the same company in other 
countries.  
 
2.3. Precautionary fund 
It is a fund that every business must accrue, preferably in the form of an account outside of 
its operations, covering the costs stemming from the payment of labor obligations 
stemming from an eventual closure. 
 
Pros Cons Position of the consulting 
team 
Proposal conditions or 
considerations 
Would guarantee the 
existence of funds to 
cover labor rights, in 
the case of closure or 
layoffs.  
The fact that the fund 
would be in the hands 
of a financial entity 
would prevent the 
employer from 
physically leaving and 
depriving workers of 
their rights.  
 
Employers would make the 
point that when becoming 
part of the free zone regime, 
they deposit a bond, which 
varies by country, of between 
10 and 50 thousand dollars.  
However, this bond does not 
constitute a precautionary 
fund, despite the fact that 
when an employer illegally 
flees, this becomes part of the 
capital used to settle total 
debts.  
In countries such as El 
Salvador, there is a lack of 
trust in private financial 
services providers, caused by 
the negative experiences 
encountered with pension 
fund administrators.  
It is based on the premise that 
A precautionary fund would 
necessarily have to be 
required of all companies, not 
only maquilas, under the 
principle of equality under 
the law.   
It would assume that the 
employer would defraud 
workers and the State.  
It deregulates the State’s 
capacity and its institutions, 
responsible for enforcing 
laws. 
The tendency towards labor 
flexibility in the region 
threatens the sustainability of 
these types of long term 
funds. 
Legislating in this matter 
would involve a long and 
tedious process, encountering 
The measures should be 
applied in all Central 
American countries, to 
avoid the possibility of this 
as a competitive 
disadvantage for the 
attraction of foreign 
investment by the country 
where it is applied.  
A study of financial 
services providers should be 
conducted in order to 
establish which are 
qualified to administer the 
funds, based on efficiency, 
security and protection 
criteria. In addition, the 
supervising entities of these 
financial services providers 
would need to be 
strengthened. 
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the employer will defraud 
workers and the State.  
It deregulates the State’s 
capacity and its institutions, 
responsible for enforcing 
laws. 
In the majority of countries, 
workers distrust private 
financial institutions and 
public providers are 
insignificant, with few 
exceptions.  
 
The tendency towards labor 
flexibility in the region 
threatens the sustainability of 
these types of long term 
funds, through 
subcontracting. Another 
problem is the reigning 
impunity of companies that 
deduct pension fund 
contributions from workers 
and do not deliver them to the 
corresponding entities.  
innumerable obstacles from 
employers and their allies. 
The free zone regimes may be 
in contradiction with efforts to 
enforce a statutory fund.  
For any administered fund, 
efficiency, safety and 
protection criteria should be 
considered. 
 
If this proposal were adopted, 
it would merit a study of 
providers of financial 
services: private, public, 
foreign and cooperatives. 
Another condition would be 
the strengthening of 
supervising entities. 
 
It requires the reversal of 
the impunity enjoyed by 
companies that violate labor 
legislation. Otherwise some 
companies would comply 
and others would not, 
without consequence, which 
would limit the 
effectiveness of the measure 
as some companies would 
be able to take advantage of 
the fund for their benefit. 
2.4. Labor liabilities  
Labor liabilities are a financial accrual to meet future employer obligations of a monetary 
nature (money) that have a financial impact on the company. Some of the persons consulted 
for this study believe that funds to cover this obligation should be deposited with a financial 
services provider, as has been suggested for the precautionary fund. 
 
Pros Cons Position of the consulting 
team 
Proposal conditions or 
considerations 
There are draft legislative 
bills regarding this liability 
in Honduras and Nicaragua.  
However, currently it is not 
being discussed by the 
legislatures.    
It is known that there are 
initiatives from civil society 
that are in their files as well 
as initiatives from political 
parties. 
A proposal in Nicaragua is 
trying to get Congressional 
attention.  
Such a proposal may be 
able to generate political 
will in some countries.  
Workers and their 
organizations support these 
measures, given the greater 
risk to workers associated 
with the evasion of these 
Our inquiries and review of 
studies demonstrate that 
there is strong opposition 
by employers to hand over 
the accruals for labor 
liabilities to a third party.  
They state that turning it 
over in advance or funding 
the liability from year to 
year in an account 
administered by a third 
party would create financial 
stress, as they use this 
money as working capital.  
At most, they may be 
willing to hand over 
payment for some labor 
benefits, such as annual 
severance or indemnity 
(COHEP, Maquila 
Association, Honduras). 
Possible political will 
An employer cannot be forced 
to deposit labor liabilities in an 
account, under the 
administration of a third party, 
because labor liabilities are a 
financial accrual for future 
employer obligations of a 
monetary nature and have a 
financial effect on the 
company.  
The employer decides how to 
safeguard or utilize labor 
liability funds; it is essential 
that the company complies with 
labor rights at the time payment 
is required.  
The State must insure that this 
liability is paid to workers. 
An accrual is an accounting 
measure for a definite 
obligation; it is set by law based 
on a combination of time and 
These measures should 
be applied in all Central 
American countries to 
avoid their being 
considered as a 
competitive 
disadvantage in the 
country where it is 
applied for the attraction 
of foreign investment. 
It is not viable in 
political or legal terms. 
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labor rights lies with the 
fact that the aforementioned 
liability is in the employer’s 
hands and the employer 
decides if payment is to be 
made.  
contrasts with national 
policies for attracting 
foreign direct investment 
and job generation should 
there be withdrawal of 
employers from its free 
zones.  
work (Christmas bonus, etc.)  
An accrual is not made for 
uncertain labor obligations, for 
example indemnity, as its 
accrual depends on whether 
terminations are made without 
just cause. 
 
2.5. Company´s financial health indicator system 
This system would monitor emerging problems, through leading indicators that would warn 
when a company is facing problems. It seeks to solve problems and prevent unexpected 
closures that leave workers unemployed and without access to their labor and social rights.   
 
Pros Cons Position of the consulting 
team 
Proposal conditions or 
considerations 
Companies participating in 
this type of program may 
gain advantages stemming 
from transparency. 
Brands should prioritize 
contracts with these 
manufacturers.  
It allows prevention of 
extreme situations that 
jeopardize workers’ rights. 
Indicators exists that alert 
when companies face 
problems.  
Create an organization to 
develop and generate 
these indicators at a 
regional level. 
As it would be a voluntary 
program, it would benefit 
only workers from 
companies that participate. 
It assumes an agreement 
among the parties to solve 
existing problems with the 
implementation of worker 
rights. 
It requires political will on 
the part of governments to 
enforce these measures and 
to prevent manufacturers 
from presenting altered 
records.  
 
 
The idea is to anticipate 
closures, whether legal or 
illegal, by reviewing 
indicators such as timely 
payment of wages and 
social benefits. 
It can be achieved by a 
system of cross-check of 
information available to the 
institutions in the public 
sector. 
It could be combined with a 
requirement that in order to 
export, manufacturers 
present certification that 
payments to social security 
are up to date, for example. 
 
These measures should be 
applied in all Central 
American countries  to 
avoid the system from 
becoming a competitive 
disadvantage for the 
attraction of foreign 
investment by the country 
where it is applied.  
The primary source of 
information should be 
government institutions, 
conducting a cross-check of 
the different entities in the 
public sector. 
An additional source of 
information could be the 
existing verification 
programs in the sector. 
Trade unions should have 
complete access to financial 
health indicators from the 
companies. 
 
 
 
  
 Asociación Servicios de Promoción Laboral - ASEPROLA  
 
19 
 
Ministerio Público
( Penal)
Instituciones de la Seguridad Social
Atención y previsión de la salud
Ministerio de 
Economía y 
Comercio Instituciones de la 
Tributación Directa
Ministerios del Trabajo y de 
Seguridad social
( Tutela administrativa)
Sistema de control Cruzado
3. Social protection options offered by the public sector  
3.1. Institutional cross-check system  
Government institutions dealing with productive activities and the protection of labor and 
social rights establish a cross-check system regarding the status of the company’s 
obligations. 
 
Pros Cons Position of the consulting 
team 
Proposal conditions or 
considerations 
Promotes transparency 
and induces companies 
to be current in fulfilling 
their obligations.  
Brands should only 
source from firms that 
have the certification 
emitted by the 
government Cross-
Check System.  
It requires the political will 
of governments who have 
demonstrated complicity 
with and favored impunity 
of enterprises that have not 
complied with established 
laws. 
We suggest that this system 
be implemented in 
conjunction with the 
Company´s Health Indicator 
System 
The following should be part 
of the cross-information 
system:  
- Social Security Institutions  
- Labor Ministry. 
- Tax Institutions. 
- Ministry of Economy and 
Trade. 
- Public Prosecutor  
Should deny right to export 
to companies that do not 
demonstrate they are current 
with their legal obligations 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
Social Security Institutions        
Health Care Institut ons 
SystemSsSysAttention 
Public Prosecutor 
(Penal) 
Direct Tax Institutions 
Ministry of 
Economy and 
Trade 
Public Prosecutor 
(Penal) 
Ministry of Labor and Social 
Security        (Admini tration) 
Cross-Check System 
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3.2. Worker rights defense 
Defense of worker rights would be based on the model of defense of human rights through 
autonomous institutions that promote human rights and the rights of citizens in the face of 
failure or omissions by the State to implement such rights.  In addition, the institutions 
perform the function of promoting dialogue between citizens and authorities for the 
resolution of conflict  
 
Pros Cons Position of the consulting 
team 
Proposal conditions or 
considerations 
Could exercise  better 
supervision of the 
State’s obligations in 
order for workers and 
employers can adjust 
to the legal system 
regarding labor 
matters. 
There are no documented 
experiences with worker rights 
defense. It is focused on the 
actions of the State with limited 
power to exercise supervision 
of enterprises, of employers 
and of trade unions (in the case 
of workers) because they are 
private entities. 
In Guatemala, El Salvador and 
Nicaragua the actions of 
institutions in defense of the 
people focus on the 
Procuraduría de Derechos 
Humanos and in Honduras on 
the National Commission for 
Human Rights 
It is necessary to have an 
authorized institution to 
monitor transparency of the 
State’s tutelage of worker 
rights. 
Furthermore, worker rights 
should be considered as part of 
human rights, as has been 
recognized internationally.  
Human rights defense 
offices in the countries 
studied should undertake 
the establishment of an 
entity to perform the 
function of supervising the 
State’s transparency with 
respect to protection of 
worker rights. 
3.3. Labor capitalization fund
6
 
It is a fund established with tripartite contributions (employer, employee, the State) that 
provides some percentage of unemployment benefits.  It is usually an annual percentage, 
broken down into twelfths, sent by the employer to an administrator, private or state. Its 
objective is that every person should have savings that guarantees, in the event of dismissal 
or unemployment, access to a percentage amount or equal to a salary.   
 
Pros Cons Position of the consulting 
team  
Proposal conditions or 
considerations  
Does not result in additional 
capital expenditures for the 
employer; a mere 4.17% of the 
severance fund. 
For the worker, it represents 
2.08% of wages, for example, 
in Nicaragua, with an average 
base salary of $133.00; it 
would be $2.70 dollars per 
month. 
It has the advantage, as in the 
case of Costa Rica, that the 
worker-employer 
contributions turned over to 
Distrust of financial 
institutions, based on 
previous negative 
experiences with the 
administration of 
Pension Funds (AFP) 
and Offshore accounts. 
Fragility of the financial 
systems and some 
elements of corruption 
not controlled by 
Central American States 
would need to be 
studied if these funds 
In the opinion of the 
consulting team, this be the 
best alternative given the 
conditions in the region; it has 
shown usefulness in some 
countries. 
In consultations, this proposal 
was the best accepted by the 
sectors. 
It may not solve the problem 
of closures, but it does 
guarantee, when closure 
occurs, a better degree of 
protection for workers. 
Full exercise of worker 
protection and supervision 
by the State. 
Penal sanctions to be 
imposed on employers that 
collect contributions from 
workers and do not deliver 
them to the financial 
entity. 
Participation of various 
financial entities to 
promote competition and 
higher profits generated by 
the fund. 
                                                          
6
 See complete document of proposal at Annex B. 
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the state were not increased; 
there was an adjustment to the 
percentage rates.  
Employers who pay a yearly 
severance would only pay the 
yearly percentage, eliminating 
the contributions previously 
delivered to the Capitalization 
Fund.  
are to be established  so 
they do not become 
spoils for unscrupulous 
people. 
In this proposal, the brands do 
not have direct participation; 
however, they should provide 
funds for the process and put 
pressure on their suppliers in 
the maquilas so that they do 
not oppose its creation. 
Political will and 
willingness of the States to 
implement it.  Projected 
contribution of 8.33%, 
which represent a twelfth 
of salary. 
 
 
Summary of the Model 
Distributing the 8.33%, corresponding to each of the parties contributing to the fund, the following 
values are obtained. 
Table #1. Contributions of each party, with respect to the 
worker’s salary 
Company (employer) 4.17% 
State 2.08% 
Worker 2.08% 
Total 8.33% 
 
 
Table #2. Estimate of annual Budget for state contributions, for 
unemployment protection. 
Country 
Number of workers 
(textile, footwear industry) 
2/ 
Average 
salary  $ 
approx. 
(monthly) 
State 
Contribution 
State Annual 
Budget $ approx.   
El Salvador 100,000 174 2.08% 4,348,260   
Nicaragua 90,000 133 2.08% 2,991,303   
Honduras 110,000 215 2.08% 5,910,135   
Guatemala 92,000 250 2.08% 5,747,700   
 
Table #3. Estimate of company contributions (employer), for unemployment protection 
Country 
% Company 
contribution (employer) 
Average salary 
$ approx. 
(monthly) 
Cost $ to 
employer 
per worker 
(monthly) 
Cost $ to employer 
per worker (annual) 
El Salvador 4.17% 174 7.25 87 
Nicaragua 4.17% 133 5.54 66 
Honduras 4.17% 215 8.95 107 
Guatemala 4.17% 250 10.41 125 
 
Only 2.08% is withdrawn from worker’s salary. The contribution of employer and State cannot be 
withdrawn from the worker’s salary. 
 
EMPLOYER     
( 50%) 
STATE              
( 25%) 
WORKER           
( 25%) 
UNEMPLOYMENT 
FUND: 
1-6 months            
salary 
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4. Social protection options offered by brands 
Brands are part of a chain that is violating worker rights 
The basic issues that influence rights of workers in this sector in Central America are the 
structures of exploitation and inequality generated by the value chain of textile and 
footwear maquilas. The difference between what is paid to a worker for sewing a piece of 
apparel and the final price by consumers is abysmal, as at every step of the value chain, the 
actors (manufacturer, brands, wholesaler) are applying their profit margin so that the 
smaller share of the garment’s final price is received by the workers who sew it7.  It is a 
matter of labor justice, of the distribution of wealth socially produced and of the 
appropriation of another person’s labor. The colossal disproportion is evident and is the 
base of poverty cycles in Central American countries. A better distribution is possible and 
is in the hands of those holding the greatest power in the chain: the brands, which could pay 
more for production costs to the manufacturer and demand compliance with labor rights. 
 
Verification systems, codes of conduct and social corporate responsibility 
Two “principles” must be kept in mind: 
a. Voluntary verification systems do not appear to be sufficiently effective, if compliance 
depends on the manufacturers that produce the garment.  This does not mean that 
improvements for workers do not occur upon intervention. 
b. The best code of conduct is to obey the law. 
Without detriment to the self-check that brands apply, it must not be forgotten that they are 
part of the same productive chain in whose links the law is being broken and workers’ 
rights are being violated. For the time being, the principle of cost reduction has prevailed, 
above all by exploiting workers more. However, when the brands intervene in a conflict, 
their effectiveness is greater than that of the governments, due to their capacity to exert 
economic pressure. Interviewees accused companies of having dual accounting records, 
which go undetected by the brands’ audits. 
The Corporate Social Responsibility departments of the brands do not appear to have real 
power; they intervene to appease conflict, but are powerless against the financial arm of the 
companies.  Their role is perceived as of public relations, with little ability to resolve 
problems
8
; it is necessary to have an international scandal to have action. A task corporate 
social responsibility programs might assume is to establish mitigation policies to prevent 
the impact caused when production is relocated or orders suspended to manufacturers, and 
not only act once the violation has occurred or is occurring. 
Commitment of brands with the right of association 
                                                          
7
 Interview with Fausto Payés of IDHUCA, El Salvador. 
8
 Reference to interviews with Guillermo Matamoros from the Honduras Maquila Association, who indicates 
that on occasion the brands delay production, because the members of his association obey the law, and that 
should be enough.  Brands should instead focus on controls and not on making visits to check, he says. 
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The self-organization of workers into their natural organizations is a condition for a 
democratic society, a counterbalance to the disproportionate power held by maquila 
employers and a mechanism for the enforceability of worker rights. International brands 
and contractors should not place orders from manufacturers that have demonstrated a 
practice of anti-union activities not only for ethical reasons but also because in so doing 
they are endorsing the violation of laws that establish this right. It is impossible for the 
brands to remain unaware of the bribery and threats suffered by workers. We recommend: 
a. Establishing respect for freedom of association as a condition for placement of 
production contracts. 
b. Contributing to eradicate undesirable practices such as dismissal of workers for 
attempting to form a union and “blacklists” by which no other company will hire them. 
 
Other commitments that should be met by the brands 
Brands should commit to ensuring obligations are met in the countries that manufacture for 
them.  Some concrete mechanism could help: 
- Publish on their websites the prices of their products in the different markets. 
- Inform where and who manufactures their products. 
- Participate as witnesses in institutional and legal proceedings in cases of fraud against 
workers and the State. 
- Collaborate with authorities when their suppliers flee or elude responsibilities. 
- Assume the responsibilities breached by their suppliers, including labor debt. If the 
manufacturer will not pay, the manufacturer should be turned in to the authorities. 
- Support modification of federal laws in the United States of America in order to make it 
feasible to file judicial processes in that territory. The above is based on the Federal 
Law regarding Acts of Corruption committed by U.S. companies abroad. 
- Comply with the “Duty to Report”; for example in Guatemala in 2005, the crime of 
labor discrimination by reason of gender, union persecution, etc., was established by 
law.  The failure to report discriminatory acts is punishable by prison. 
- Verification processes imply a legal duty to report of the person conducting the 
verification, in the country where the violation occurs, as well as in the country of 
origin. This must also apply to certification companies. It cannot be allowed that crimes 
against fundamental human rights and labor rights are known and nothing happens. 
 
5. Political considerations (laws and regulations) 
Central American countries must revise their policies for the attraction of foreign direct 
investment of textile and footwear maquilas, on the basis of tax exemptions, because it is 
stimulating a logic that is adverse to national and social interests, for various reasons: 
a. Foreign manufacturers that invoice millions do not pay taxes; however, national 
businesses, including the informal sector and SME - Small and Medium Enterprises - 
(PYMES) do pay a different type of tax. 
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b. The real attractiveness for manufacturers to relocate to Central American countries is 
the low cost of labor and the current state of impunity regarding enforcement of labor 
obligations.  
c. Maquilas use public infrastructure but do not contribute to their construction and 
maintenance. 
d. The attraction of foreign investment should be based on the quality of human resources 
(education, technical training). 
The research carried out for this investigation identified a series of proposals related to the 
revision, application and development of laws and regulations, including. 
a. Free Zone laws: Revise the method for regulating investment in maquilas and the 
State’s control. Export should not be authorized unless obligations are currently being 
met. Fictional closures and reopening under a new registered company name to 
fraudulently extend the privileges given by the law should not be allowed. 
b. Policies and mechanisms to attract foreign investment: There are employers that prefer 
to pay a pitiful fine for firing unionized employees and for bad labor practices. 
c. Labor Code: Requires modernization in some countries with regard to indemnity, 
written dismissal notices, establishing causes for dismissal. Violations of the precepts 
established in these codes prevail. 
d. Commercial Code: Must be updated regarding company registered name; illegal 
closures; reopening under a different registered company name; hiring foreign labor; 
process of liquidation of a legal entity which leads to cancelling debts with workers. 
The very low amounts required to open a corporation are laughable (5,000 USD in 
Guatemala) as this is the social capital on which closures are based despite the fact that 
millions of dollars are invoiced. 
e. Minimum wage: Not revised periodically nor adjusted for cost of living. When there are 
general wage increases, at times maquila workers are excepted. 
f. Salaries Commission: They are tripartite organs for building consensus, but do not 
function for lack of interest on part of the governments. 
g. Social Security: Not making contributions or withholding payment of fees is a crime, 
but remains unpunished. Social Security Institutions must guarantee that workers 
receive proof that their fees are current. 
h. Production goals: There are gaps in regulations regarding production goals, leading to 
employer abuse. Some maquilas demand that goals be met on Saturdays and with 
unpaid overtime hours; there are even claims that workers are charged for energy 
consumption.  
i. Capital flight: There are gaps in the legislation that prevents leasing machinery, which 
is used to elude payment of labor rights at the time of closure. There even detachable 
installations. 
j. Right to unionize:  It is not respected due to noncompliance by institutions protecting 
this right, during employment and in the case of closure. 
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k. Conflict resolution: In El Salvador, within the framework of the Superior Council for 
Labor, there is a Commission for Conflict Resolution in the Maquila that is not 
functioning. 
l. Institutional coordination: All government institutions related in some form to labor and 
the maquila must be coordinated and intervene to improve the rights situation. 
m. Cross-check: Establish cross-checks between the Ministry of Labor, Tax Department, 
Social Security, Ministry of Economy, Public Prosecutor in each country so that exports 
will not be authorized unless the enterprise is current with its obligations and evasion 
and appropriation of social security fees is legally punished. 
n. Surety Bond: In some countries a bond is established which foreign companies must 
pay. In Guatemala it is $ 50,000 USD (obsolete). To elude it, foreign companies register 
as national enterprises.  
o. ILO Conventions: Governments ratify them but fail to comply with them. 
p. Institutional strengthening: Provide the necessary resources to implement labor 
inspections; increase the salaries of inspectors; impose sanctions on officials and judges 
for failure to comply as an example to others. 
 
Conclusions 
From the commercial point of view, any social benefit will represent an additional cost to 
the value of the product, which will reduce the profit margin of either the manufacturer of 
the garment or of the retailer or the brand that purchases and distributes it.  Or it may result 
in an increase in the final price that could diminish competitiveness of the product with 
regards to cost and price. 
It is clear that precautionary funds, though currently they are not placed with third parties 
but rather are within the control of enterprises, imply relatively high costs at the time of 
settling accounts with the worker, be it with individual workers or with a large mass of 
workers.  This is important to understand why some enterprises decide to end production  
evading such payments; this is the case in Central America as well as and in the rest of the 
planet where maquilas have been established
9
. 
The funds for the protection of workers described in this investigation make it clear that the 
financial mass that can be potentially attracted is significant, and therefore who and 
how they will be administered is a critical point to be considered in assessing whether to 
support any alternative.  While they are important for workers, they do not represent the 
complete solution to the labor problem. 
Contingency funds are an interesting approach, but their creation would require persuading 
employers, the State and brands to exercise corporate solidarity, which is not common 
                                                          
9 In the interviews and analysis for this investigation, we repeatedly learned of efforts made by employers to find other 
forms to adjust this precautionary fund in order to reduce dismissal costs. 
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in business, as contributions might cover the illegal behavior of a competitor that decides to 
fraudulently close a work center. 
Any proposal that is ultimately implemented must not elude the central problem, which is 
the need to strengthen institutions that guarantee compliance with the law by all actors in 
productive processes. In order for the proposals to impact the construction of democratic 
societies and a better distribution of wealth socially produced it is critical to put the 
system, its regulations and institutions to work.  
Violation of labor and social rights of workers is a political matter, with legal 
implications, that cannot be reduced to economic relations and transcends the 
productive sphere. Manufacturers must comply with the law, officials have to enforce the 
law, contractors and brands have legal and ethical obligations. Failure to comply must be 
pursued as violations of civil, administrative or penal matters.  For this reason, we believe 
that the cross-check system would be an important and merits consideration in Central 
America as a regional project. 
In the case of maquilas, governments should not allow the manufacturer not up-to-date 
in meeting its obligations to export. Central America must direct its efforts towards 
standardization of labor and social regulations in order to break the vicious competition 
to lower rights as a competitive strategy and to attract foreign investment. 
It is essential to strengthen the ability of worker unions and of the NGO (Non-
governmental organizations) working on this matter to act, so that they may exercise 
their role of defense, public exposure, proposals and overall involvement regarding this 
reality.  
Any proposal to enhance social protection should be established in all countries in 
Central America, to prevent the argument that if only one country applied it, it would 
lose competitiveness.  This implies that it would necessary to influence politically the 
Central American Integration System (SICA). A limiting factor is that labor jurisdiction is 
not supranational, which facilitates illegal closures and the flight of manufacturers. 
It would be interesting to involve the Department of Labor in the United States, to 
coordinate with the project “Better Work” which started a pilot in Nicaragua, in 
considering some of the proposals from this research in order to promote greater and more 
permanent oversight of working conditions and violation of rights
10
. 
 
                                                          
10 Expressed by Minister of Labor of El Salvador, Mme.  Minister Victoria Velásquez. 
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Annexes 
A - Methodology 
This chapter presents the methodology used in the execution of this consultancy. It starts with 
description of the basic principles that guided team members during this consultancy. 
Basic principles of the methodological focus 
Based on our experience executing similar missions, the following basic principles necessary in 
order to involve the target groups and all other actors were formulated: 
 Active involvement of relevant actors, in order to optimize the ownership process and the 
learning effect.  
 Special attention to the participation and perceptions of interested parties and key 
informants, in order to guarantee results and motivate ownership.  
 Combination of team experiences and perspectives – a team with broad experience at the 
international level in the matter of social and labor rights -- in such a way that 
complementarity was guaranteed.  
 Accomplishment of the results of the mission applying the principles of triangulation, 
monitoring and evaluation. The members of the team combine diverse skills and access to 
sources of information, according to the requirements of the consultancy (document study, 
interviews with diverse actors, participatory workshops, focus groups, participatory action 
research, physical presence, etc.) in order to conduct triangulated tracking. 
 The team shares the principles and values of anonymity and confidentiality, responsibility, 
integrity, independence, communication regarding impact and validation of information 
consistent with a high sense of work ethic.   
Methodological phases 
The Project was implemented in three large phases: a preparatory phase (office work and consulting 
key informants); execution phase in the field; and synthesis and preparation for dissemination of 
results phase. The key activities of each phase are described briefly below.  
Phase 1: Preparatory phase 
The preparatory phase included various activities, beginning with various initial meeting of the 
implementation team and with knowledgeable representatives of key sectors, and concluding with 
the organization of the field work. Some of the activities in this phase were: coordination meetings, 
document study, interviews to frame the object of study, operationalization of the methodological 
focus, planning, instrument design, and final development of the methodology. At the end of the 
preparatory phase, the following results were achieved: 
 The research framework and the methodological proposal were finalized;  
 Detailed instruments for meetings with different actors were developed; 
 Data collection and analysis was initiated; 
 Techniques for the collection of data were developed; 
 The program and schedule for field work were finalized.  
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Phase 2: Field work  
Team meeting 
At the beginning of the fieldwork phase, the implementation team met to discuss methodology, the 
focus of the research, the results of the study of documentation and of consultations with relevant  
informants, in order to refine the program for field work. 
Initial meeting with allies in the target countries 
Prior to starting activities in the field, a meeting was coordinated with contacts in the countries in 
the region and with experts in the matter and representatives of institutions and organizations 
relevant to the study.  This effort gained allies for the work.  The objective of the research, the 
methodology and the work schedule were discussed.  The meeting also helped to develop a list of 
persons to interview during the field work. 
Field visits 
Visits to each country included in the study were planned. The detailed program of field visits 
(calendar, actors, activities, etc.) was finalized after refining the methodology for intervention and 
reaching consensus with allies and local actors. Field work typically included the following 
activities:  
 Meeting with leaders of social – labor organizations.  Sufficient time was dedicated to this 
activity in each of the countries, because collaboration with these organizations in each of 
the countries was essential to the success of the study.  It allowed the collection of opinions 
and perceptions of union leaders and persons working for NGOs on labor issues. 
Methodology: semi-structured interview, workshop type meeting. 
 Visit to leading companies and employers in the sector. The team did not identify 
companies in the textile and footwear sector that could be considered as models with 
respect to the application of instruments for the protection of labor rights.  An attempt was 
made to interview representatives from the textile and footwear employer sector, even 
though they did not have protective instruments, to understand the challenges they face.  
However, it was only possible to meet with one business representative. Methodology: 
direct observation and semi-structured meeting. 
 Document analysis. Identification, selection, review, classification and analysis of 
secondary documents.  Methodology: content analysis. 
 Meeting with social and labor organizations. In each country, participatory meeting were 
organized with different social groups, primarily with unions and maquila workers. The 
meetings were planned in close collaboration with local allies. Methodology: group 
interview in combination with methods for participative analysis (workshop type and focus 
groups). 
 Interviews with institutional actors. Representatives of the public sector whose opinions 
and experiences support the objective of the research (particularly the pertinence, coherence 
and design of protection mechanism for workers faced with dismissal or closure) were 
interviewed. The purpose of the interviews was to gather input from designers and 
executors of public policy, including those related to labor protection, enforceability of 
rights, private sector incentives, administration of financial services. A highlight was the 
interview granted by the Minister of Labor in El Salvador. Methodology: semi-structured 
interviews. 
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 Development of options and comparative analysis: As part of the field work, data 
processing and analysis was conducted, applying comparison criteria between countries 
with similar economies.  
The first field visit tested the validity of the methodology and ensured that all members of the team 
worked with the same objectives in mind. After the first visit, which occurred in El Salvador, the 
team broke up into country teams to improve the efficiency of the mission. 
 
Persons consulted by country and gender 
 
Country Total Men Women 
El Salvador 10 5 5 
Guatemala 26 17 9 
Honduras 12 7 5 
Nicaragua 21 16 5 
Total 69 45 24 
Discussion and dissemination of information 
During the execution of the project, but above all at the end of the field work phase, the 
implementation team met to compare and analyze the collected information and to formulate as a 
group the initial results and recommendations. The initial results were presented to FLA by means 
of a preliminary report and through a telephone conference call.  Ideally it would be best to conduct 
discussion workshops, but this is limited by the mission terms and the high cost of travel in Central 
America. 
It is suggested to FLA that it circulate the Report to other highly qualified individuals, if deemed 
pertinent. The objectives of the discussion process would be: 1) present, validate and add to the 
preliminary results; 2) discuss and reflect upon possible outstanding issues; 3) create ownership by 
stakeholders and stimulate the learning process. 
  
Phase 3: Synthesis and dissemination of products and results 
Three activities are anticipated in the last phase of the process: 
Draft the preliminary report 
The final report is prepared according to the requirements established by FLA. This document 
synthesizes the results of the field work in the different countries and formulates conclusions and 
recommendations consistent with the objective of the consultancy. The principle of team work has 
been maintained throughout the development of the final report. A preliminary report was 
presented, for comments and reactions, as previously described.   
Deliver the final project report 
The final version of the report took into consideration the various comments and reactions 
formulated about the preliminary report. 
Presentation to SAFI 
We are anticipating an oral presentation of the results to a meeting of the Sustainable Apparel and 
Footwear Initiative (SAFI) taskforce, to be scheduled in mid-March, 2011. 
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B – Individual capitalization fund (for unemployment protection)11 
1. Context of unemployment protection in Costa Rica: 
Costa Rica is the Central American country with the greatest social protection and labor legislation. 
Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that there have also been cases of well known companies in the 
textile industry that had been operating in country for years and suddenly left, leaving workers in a 
difficult economic situation and not complying with the payment of severance required by Costa 
Rican labor legislation. 
Although the legal figure of severance in Costa Rica is very clear, its disadvantage is that the money 
to pay it is not separate and not managed by a third party, but must be provided by the employer at 
the time the worker is terminated. This creates the disadvantage that if the employer fails to comply, 
workers must file suit with the Ministry of Labor and/or the courts, a process that involves a period 
of time during which workers are without resources urgently needed due to unemployment. The 
contribution to severance is one month for each year of employment (8.33%), up to a maximum of 
8 years. 
In addition to severance, there is a Labor Capitalization Fund. This fund represents 3% of the 
worker’s salary and the worker can dispose of this fund in case of unemployment or every 5 years if 
the worker so wishes.  If the worker does not make use of this fund, it is added as a complementary 
pension. 
In the case of Central American countries, which have lower levels of social protection, the 
proposal that is presented below would be an approach that combines the concepts previously 
explained into a single simple proposal, that is, an Individual Capitalization Fund (for 
unemployment protection). 
The proposal can be seen as an indemnity for termination, severance or unemployment insurance. 
2. Proposal for an individual capitalization fund (for unemployment) 
The proposal consists of the following: 
 Create an individual capitalization fund, administered by a third party, be it a bank or 
financial institution, authorized by the government to offer these services. The 
administrator would have to use for the individual capitalization funds a trust type structure 
similar to the ones used for pensions in Costa Rica. 
 Establish and individual fund that includes one to six monthly salaries, to be provided to the 
worker at the time of termination.  
 The individual fund is created during the first 6 years of work for each worker. The first 
year, the fund must include the equivalent to one month salary and so on until it results in a 
six-month fund. Once the 6-month fund is established for the worker, the state and the 
employer no longer incur any costs with respect to severance or unemployment. From that 
point forward, the individual fund grows as a function of the earned interest and 
profitability of the fund achieved by the administrator. 
                                                          
11
 Proposal developed by Lic. Carlos Pacheco Ramírez and Ing. Daniel Pacheco Arias, San José, February 
2011, 
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 In order to create, in a time lapse of one year, the fund equivalent to a one month salary, the 
amount collected is equivalent to one twelfth of a worker’s salary, that is 8.33%. 
 The unemployment protection system is financed by the company (employer), the worker 
and the state. The following proportions are suggested: 
 Enterprise (employer): 50% 
 State: 25% 
 Worker: 25% 
 
Figure 1. Contribution schematic, individual unemployment protection fund 
Distributing the 8.33%  among the three parties contributing to the fund yields the following 
values:. 
Table #1. Contribution for each party, with respect to the worker’s salary 
 
Company(employer) 4.17% 
State 2.08% 
Worker 2.08% 
Total 8.33% 
   
3. Other considerations regarding the fund for dismissals 
 Only 2.08% is withdrawn from the worker’s salary. The contribution of the employer and 
state cannot be taken from the worker.  
EMPRESA
(Aporta 50%)
ESTADO 
(Aporta 25%)
FONDO 
DESEMPLEO: 
1-6 meses de 
salario
TRABAJADOR 
(Aporta 25%)
E PLOYER     
(50%) 
TE             
(25%) 
WORKER           
(25%) 
UNEMPLOYMENT 
FUND: 
1- 6 month’s            
salary 
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 The idea is that various banks and fund administrators will offer these services, in order to 
have a healthy competition for the service offered to the client, providing an adequate 
balance of security with respect to management and profitability. It would be up to each 
country to regulate whether a worker can choose the fund administrator or if workers, by an 
annual vote, decide on a single administrator, in order to simply payments for the employer 
and for fiscal control. 
 The fund is managed by a third party. It is not recommended that the fund be administered 
by the health department in the social security system of the country to avoid conflicts in 
the management of the funds (given the needs in the matter of health) that would put in 
question the availability of the funds to the worker at risk at the time of unemployment.  
 In Costa Rica, actions by employers to separate severance funds and transfer them to 
solidarity associations, a special regime of a legal entity operating independently from the 
company, has been successful.  This provides another option, in addition to the banks, that 
could manage the funds. 
 The fund would belong to the worker, regardless of the cause of termination. The Ministry 
of Labor (or similar entity) in each country would be responsible for assisting the 
terminated worker and providing the fund administrator the assurance (approval) for the 
bank or financial institution to proceed to pay the worker. The Ministry of Labor would 
have a maximum of 15 days to resolve the issue.  In the case where, either due to 
incompetence or shortage of human resources the Ministry of Labor is unable to act on the 
requests, automatic approval would be granted.  Otherwise, a cumbersome process would 
divert unemployment payment and leave the worker economically unprotected for many 
months, awaiting payments. 
 If a worker defrauds the system and receives payments from the fund without employment 
termination, the state and the employer are under no obligation to reincorporate the 
employee into the fund. However, the worker can contribute to the fund based on his or her 
own contribution. This contribution can range from 2.08% to 8.33%. It is recommended 
that the worker contribute at least at the level of the minimum rate during 4 years, until a 
fund of one monthly salary to be used upon termination is built. 
 If termination does not occur, the resources in the individual fund are added as a 
complement to the worker’s pension. 
 A company or business chamber or association may question why should a company have 
to contribute social costs for unemployment, if such company may never terminate a 
worker or group of workers? The reason is that when a company encounters financial 
problems, it will be vulnerable to inability to meet its payment obligations and at the time 
of bankruptcy or closure, it will not be able to meet obligations unless a fund has been 
previously created separate from other accounts and financed. Thus, the proposed system 
leads to one fewer headache for all, including the employer, at a time of company crisis or 
for an entire sector of the economy. Because it is impossible to know beforehand who or 
which companies will declare bankruptcy or move, it is best to put in place a practice of 
social responsibility, as proposed here, that covers worker termination of employment from 
a company, independent of the cause for termination. 
 The primary reasons why the protection should be independent of the cause for termination 
are the following. Firstly, because the payments and contributions are made with the 
purpose of creating a fund for each worker (individual). Secondly, because if it is 
differentiated based on cause of termination, the motive for termination could be the subject 
of litigation (between employer and worker) before the Ministry of Labor or in a court, a 
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process that would delay payment, defeating the purpose of the unemployment fund, which 
is to protect financially the worker in case of unemployment during the time period 
immediately following the termination (1 – 6 months), while other employment or form of 
sustenance is found. 
 
4. Estimation of cost to the State 
The percentage of salary contributions were previously addressed for the parties that contribute to 
the unemployment fund (worker, state, and employer). In the case of the State, the contribution 
corresponds to 2.08%. 
Given that the State undertakes the contribution for a large volume of workers, for fiscal and 
budgetary reasons it is necessary to limit the maximum salary base on which the State will 
contribute. The value of the maximum salary base on which the state will contribute can be set at 
one minimum wage plus 50% of the same. An employer can pay more than that amount to its 
workers, but the State will use this value as the maximum salary for purposes of contributions to the 
fund, in order to be able to budget responsibly and comply with its obligations. 
Should a country not have a minimum wage, it is recommended that a “minimum reference wage” 
be used, which could be the average minimum wage of 3 other countries chosen by the authorities 
(Labor Ministry or similar entity), as could be the minimum wage of 3 Central American countries.  
For the purpose of preliminary calculation of costs of the fund for the State budget, the following 
information is necessary: 
 Number of workers subject to the proposal: number of workers in the textile or footwear 
industry in each country that would be covered under this scheme of unemployment 
protection. 
 Average salary earned by the workers in the textile and footwear industry. 
Table #2. Estimate for annual cost of the State’s contributions for unemployment protection  
Country 
Number of workers 
(textile, footwear 
industry) 2/ 
Average salary  
$ approx. 
(monthly) 
Contribution 
by the State 
State annual 
budget $ 
approx.   
El Salvador 100,000 174 2.08% 4,348,260 
  
Nicaragua 90,000 133 2.08% 2,991,303 
  
Honduras 110,000 215 2.08% 5,910,135 
  
Guatemala 1/ 92,000 250 2.08% 5,747,700 
  
Salaries and number of workers: according to the information and visits conducted by the consultants to 
Central American countries 
1/ In Guatemala, in addition to the salary a Conditional Bonus (incentive) must be paid; however, it is not 
considered a part of the salary and is not used for the calculation of social benefits.  
2/ It is difficult to determine this amount due to the existence of subcontractors and the tendency on the part 
of employers to conceal data. The employment figures appear excessive, considering the dismissals that have 
taken place in the face of the current crisis. 
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According to the above estimates, in countries such as Honduras and Guatemala, the annual 
contribution corresponding to the State would approach 6 million dollars a year, while in El 
Salvador and Nicaragua it would be 4 and 3 million dollars respectively. It is important to mention 
that these levels of contributions are high only at the beginning of the fund. Subsequently (after the 
sixth year) the system reaches a balance that requires contribution levels much lower than the initial 
values, because contributions for new hires (employee turnover) and new employers in the market 
(textile sector growth) would be limited.  
Aid may be requested from cooperating countries (United States, Europe) at the start of the process 
to help with the contributions corresponding to the State. 
5. Cost Estimate to the employer per worker 
The total contribution for an employer to this fund depends on the number of workers employed and 
their level of salaries.   
 Table # 3. Estimate of company contributions (employer) for unemployment protection  
Country 
% contribution for the 
company (employer) 
Average salary 
$ approx. 
(monthly) 
Cost $ to 
company per 
worker 
(monthly) 
Cost $ to 
company per 
worker 
(annual) 
El Salvador 4.17% 174 7.25 87 
Nicaragua 4.17% 133 5.54 66 
Honduras 4.17% 215 8.95 107 
Guatemala 4.17% 250 10.41 125 
 
It should be clarified, that once the company reaches maturity and has operated for more than 6 
years with a stable workforce, the annual costs for the unemployment fund fall to minimum values, 
especially if there has been low employee turnover.  
If we use as an example the number of workers in companies of different sizes (small, medium and 
large) the following approximate values are obtained. 
Table #4. Budget estimate of company contributions (employer), for unemployment protection  
Company 
Type 
Number of workers 
(textile, footwear 
industry) 
Average 
monthly 
salary $ 
approx. in 
C.A.* 
Company 
contribution 
(employer) 
Budget $ 
monthly 
approx.   
Small 10 193 4.17% 80 
  
Medium 50 193 4.17% 402 
  
Large 500 193 4.17% 4,019 
  
*Except CR 
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6. Costs and benefits of the proposal in the framework of corporate social responsibility  
Relating the general practices of social corporate responsibility in the apparel industry to the costs 
and benefits of the proposal, the following observations can be made: 
 From a commercial standpoint, any social charge will be an additional cost to the value of 
the product, which will reduce the profit margin of the manufacturer of the garment or of 
the retailer or brand that purchases and distributes the same. Or it might result in an 
increase in the final price that could diminish the competitiveness of the product with 
respect to price.  
 Only to the extent that good social practices are sold as part of the brand, will there be an 
economic incentive for the brands that promote them.  
 This can be illustrated with an example.  Suppose a middle or upper class person from a 
developed country goes shopping to a shopping center. Suppose he observes two stores 
with a similar profile, one offers Nautica products and the other Tommy Hilfiger. Suppose 
one of the stores has a sign in the window or on its garments indicating that the brand sells 
and purchases from own plants and/or third-party plants that comply with corporate social 
responsibility that benefit its workers and gives its website, which has a link describing its 
practices and those of its suppliers
12
. If the garments are perceived by the purchaser to be 
similar in aesthetics and quality, it is possible for the client to make a differentiation of the 
brands on the basis of increased sense of social responsibility on the part of one of them. 
 Certifications and codes of conduct may be applied. Organizations like the FLA could 
create a scoring system (1 to 100) or classification or ranking of brands based on corporate 
social responsibility practices (A, B or C). Clearly, the above would be done on the basis of 
a score obtained by the brand or company in comparison against established practices and 
benchmarked to a standard (checklist), such as ISO norms or other norms that could be self-
created. The extent to which the consumer is educated and has been made aware (through 
advertising) of these issues, the possibility that they will prefer socially responsible brands 
increases, above all, if we consider the fact that developed countries are synonymous with 
increased levels of education (school attendance) of its citizens and increased exposure to 
the media (newspapers, television, radio and internet), that expose the labor problems of 
workers in third world countries. 
 Related to the above, social charges can turn from being costs to becoming benefits and 
commercial assets (social responsibility), becoming as important as the quality reputation of 
a garment. 
C – Flexibility and worker rights in Central America 
ASEPROLA and its allied organizations have been collecting, organizing, and reporting on the 
forms in which work flexibility has been adopted and on violations of labor rights in Central 
America. Flexibility strategies have as their purpose to avoid compliance with labor rights, in the 
framework of the prevailing openness model, as a competitive advantage of enterprises based on the 
reduction of social and labor benefits for the working class. 
                                                          
12
 Example: The label could say: “Our garment is produced under social responsibility practices, to the benefit 
for the workers that produce them, visit our website (www.websitename.com).”  
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Following this same logic, it aims to reduce or eliminate all types of regulations considered barriers 
to a free market and to minimize or eliminate the regulations created for the protection of worker 
rights, because they are considered to be barriers to the economic development of Central America. 
Flexibility follows two approaches: one based on legal reform and the other, the most common and 
widely spread in the region, is flexibility in fact. This violation of the rights of the working class 
applies to domestic and international regulations. 
The investigations conducted by ASEPROLA and by the Regional Campaign against Labor 
Flexibility makes evident six flexibility strategies: 
1. Flexibility of Labor Contracts, principal strategy for violating labor rights. Applied through 
subcontracting, outsourcing, procurement of professional services (masking the employment 
relationship) and home work. 
2. Flexibility strategies that threaten workers’ right to a stable job. Adopted by changing the 
company’s registered name, annual payment of indemnity to the workforce, reducing the 
seniority of workers, sudden company closures that open under a new registered name, 
temporary contracts, dismissal at end of trial period, simultaneous registration of various firms 
within a single work center, massive unjustified terminations arguing economic problems, 
absence of written contracts. 
3. Flexibility strategies that threaten workers’ right to a limited work shift. Consists of the 
illegal extension of work to all days of the week, on occasion without overtime pay. Equal 
treatment for mixed and night shifts and day shifts. Accounting for hours not on a daily basis, 
but weekly (3.5X3.5, 4X3 o 4X4), without overtime pay. Elimination of rest periods. Contracts 
based on production goals rather than on work shifts. High production goals and not hiring 
replacements to account for workers with disabilities, vacations and dismissals. Multi-
functionality of workers. 
4. Flexibility strategies that threaten workers’ right to a decent wage. Implemented through 
the extension of the work shift without overtime pay. Payment is based on production goals. 
Weekly, biweekly or monthly bonuses are conditioned on achieving daily goals. Even late 
payment of wages without paying interest. Outsourcing, through which the outsourcing 
company keeps a part of the wages.  
5. Flexibility strategies that threaten workers’ right to social security. Late payment or non-
payment of social security contributions.  Change in registered name of the enterprise to avoid 
claims. In outsourcing companies, non-payment of social security contributions is common. 
Illegal deductions are made to workers on disability or maternity leave. Company medical 
personnel on occasion covers up the non-payment of social security contributions by limiting 
the access of workers to Social Security facilities. 
6. Flexibility strategies that threaten workers’ rights to form unions. Applied through direct 
violation of the right to organize unions or through persecution of union leaders. Dismissal of 
union leaders, harassment of leaders and affiliated members. 
All these practices violate social and labor rights; additionally they threaten the legal system and 
human rights established in various international conventions. In spite of these clear violations, the 
institutions charged with protecting these rights favor impunity to the benefit of the business sector.  
While flexibility strategies extend through Central America, they are seldom sanctioned by the 
authorities, reflecting their complacence. The extreme case has been the selective murder of union 
leaders in various countries. 
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Company closures and the violation of workers’ rights 
The apparent closure of maquiladora enterprises has turned into a mechanism by which many 
factories avoid compliance with their labor responsibilities. In general, Central American 
Governments have demonstrated weakness and a lack of political will to revert these abuses and the 
violation of their own laws.  
Government institutions are weak, permissive and corrupt which facilitate impunity of offenders. 
The core of the case lies in the strategy of decentralization of the productive processes in order to 
reduce production costs, for which it is essential that production costs in southern countries or in 
Asia be cheaper. Underdeveloped countries are in ruthless competition to attract this type of foreign 
investment, which punishes the weakest link in the chain, the working class. This rationale causes 
an insurmountable contradiction: there can be no social development on the basis that it is cheaper 
to produce in the country. 
The lack of protection of maquila workers cannot be corrected with mere technical measures.  It 
is a matter of political economy at the heart of the prevalent accumulation model. Weak institutions 
and impunity are inherent to the accumulation model of the local oligarchy in alliance with 
transnational corporations; flexibility and deregulation (legal or illegal) are instruments of this 
model. Thus, in spite of the fact that each country has a series of social guarantees and  institutions, 
regulations are not implemented and impunity prevails.  
Within the rationale of this value chain, there exist different levels of empowerment; each link has a 
certain amount of power and, therefore, some responsibility for the status quo of rights violations. 
The manufacturer located in Central America, while not having the same degree of power as those 
controlling the markets, is not at the mercy of the brands. The brands do have oversight over the 
entire value chain and therefore their responsibility with regard to workers is enormous. 
Far from being victims (because they depend on work orders), manufacturers operate and compete 
within the logic of the value chain. They collaborate, participate in the determination of prices 
based on an analysis of production costs, productivity, efficiency, installed capacity, transportation, 
labor force and other factors. 
The buyer sets the level of demand and establishes a maximum price for each garment. The clothing 
transnationals offer a price to get orders and compete with other with regard to price and timeliness 
of delivery. There are manufacturers that accuse the brands of pressuring them every year to lower 
prices.  One the price per garment is negotiated, they communicate with their factories abroad and 
propose to the national producer or its subsidiaries that they would pay a certain price.  These 
enterprises, in turn, figure out their profits and calculate what they will pay workers.  The 
competition generated by this model results in ever increasing pressure to lower wages and living 
conditions of workers. 
The maximization of profit margins is transferred to workers in the form of increased exploitation 
and rights violations. 
Once the contract has been signed, manufacturers must meet the design requested by the brand and 
lower costs to increase profits. Workers end up paying for the pressure applied from above -- from 
the brands -- and are subject to production relationships and living conditions characteristic of 
slavery and feudalism occurring in the middle of the 21
st
 Century. The current crisis of global 
capitalism aggravates the situation, especially for working women who are more vulnerable and 
must accept the worst working conditions.  
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D. Investigation schedule 
 
Date Location Activity Name Organization 
Dec. 14, 
23; 2010 
SJO Coordination 
meetings  
Omar Salazar 
Giovanni Beluche V 
Carlos Pacheco 
Víctor Quesada 
ASEPROLA Director and Mission Leader 
Consultant 
Consultant 
ASEPROLA Expert 
Dec.28- 29, 
2010 
SJO Planning and 
Instrument Design 
Omar Salazar 
Giovanni Beluche 
Investigation Team 
January 3 
to 20  
SJO Contacts and 
appointments with 
informants in 
Central America 
Omar Salazar ASEPROLA Director and Mission Leader 
 
January 10 SJO Develop interview 
guide 
Giovanni Beluche Consultant 
January 11  SJO Team Meeting Omar Salazar 
Giovanni Beluche V 
Víctor Quesada 
Team Leader 
Consultant 
ASEPROLA Expert 
January 17 SJO Team Meeting Omar Salazar 
Giovanni Beluche V 
Carlos Pacheco 
Daniel Pacheco 
Team Leader 
Consultant 
Consultant 
Consultant 
January 21 SAL Travel to El 
Salvador 
Giovanni Beluche V. Consultant 
January 21  SAL Interview Vinicio Sandoval 
Francisco Chicas 
Director GMIES 
GMIES Social Auditor 
Jan. 22 SAL Interview Sergio Chávez National Labor Committee 
January 23 SAL Process Information Giovanni Beluche  Consultant 
January 24 SAL Interview Fausto Payés IDHUCA Center for Labor Rights (CDL)  
Jan. 24 SAL Interview Saúl Baños FESPAD 
January 24 SAL Focus Group Martha Saldaña 
Aracely Martínez 
Norma Martínez 
Ana Cecilia Molina 
Director FEASIES 
Mesa de la Maquila 
General Seamstress Union 
Garment Industry Union 
Jan. 25 SAL Interview Victoria Velásquez Labor Minister of El Salvador 
January 26  GUA Travel to Guatemala Giovanni Beluche  Consultant 
January 26  GUA Coordination Work 
Plan 
Ana Lucía Fuentes COVERCO Administrator 
January 26  GUA Focus Group  
 
Maritza Velásquez 
Susana Vásquez 
Floridalma Contreras 
Miriam González 
ATRAHDOM Coordinator 
Technical Facilitator 
Board of Directors 
Board of Directors 
Jan. 27  GUA Interview Rosa Galicia AMUCV & Former maquila union member 
January 27  GUA Interview Jorge Estrada 
Evelyn García 
Julio Coj 
Consulting coordinator 
UNSITRAGUA 
Consulting Sub-coordinator  
Coordinating Board 
January 27 GUA Interview Rigoberto Dueñas 
César López 
FETRACUR Secretary General 
SITRASAE Secretary General 
January 27 GUA Interview Homero Fuentes 
Claudia Contreras 
COVERCO Director  
Monitoring Coordinator 
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Date Location Activity Name Organization 
Augusto Aceytuno Monitoring 
Jan. 27 GUA Interview Alejandro Argueta Labor Lawyer and Activist 
Jan. 28 GUA Interview Adolfo Lacs UGT 
January 28 GUA Focus Group Victorino Zacarías 
Olinda Bolaños 
Odilya Xi 
Verónica Tuj 
María Pérez 
Bárbara Suculun 
Ana Palma 
Carmelita Carrillo 
Juana Molina 
Ana María Beteta 
CGTG Secretary General 
Women’s Commission of the CGTG 
Former Security officer in a Maquila 
Former maquila worker 
Former maquila worker 
Former maquila worker 
Former maquila worker 
Former maquila worker 
Former maquila worker 
Former maquila worker 
January 24  HOND Travel to Honduras Name Organization 
   Matusala Orellana 
Maritza Paredes 
Carla 
Yadira 
MINTRAB -  conciliations 
EMIH 
EMIH 
EMIH 
January 25  Hond San Pedro Sula Yadira Minero 
Julio Reyes 
Armando Villatoro 
CDM 
FITH 
CUTH – FITH 
January 26  Hond San Pedro Sula René Guevara 
Norman Portillo 
MINTRAB 
MINTRAB Regional Director 
January 27 Hond Tegucigalpa Ayax Irías 
Marlon Ochoa 
Universidad Autónoma  -  investigator 
Investigator 
January 28 Hond Tegucigalpa Guillermo 
Matamoros 
COHEP and Regional Director for the 
Honduras Maquila Association  
January 29 Nic. Coordination Coordination meeting 
of logistics impact  
ASEPROLA partners, regional campaign. 
January 31 Managua 
 
Group Session Miguel Ruiz 
Luis Barboza 
Roger Barrantes 
Secretary General, President and 
International Relations Secretary of the 
Sandinista Union Confederation 
 Managua  
 
Interview Alberto Legal Torres Executive Director of Professionals for 
Corporate Social Action.  – PASE.  
February 1  Managua 
 
Interview Marie Van Hacker, 
Frank Lensik 
Director and Regional Coordinator for 
FOS maquila programs- Belgium. 
February 2  Ciudad 
Sandino 
 
Focus Group René Barrantes -   
 
Edwin Sánchez 
Francisco Estrada 
Karla Gutiérrez 
Salguero 
Edgardo Díaz 
Bermúdez 
Edwin Díaz 
Bermúdez 
Arelys Silva Espino 
Pedro Mendoza   
Guillermo Rodríguez 
Union Promoter in maquila zones CST – 
JBE 
Board of Director of the Enrique Smith 
Union, footwear industry, SARATOGA, 
Brazilian capital, Ciudad Sandino free 
zone. 
 
February 2 Tipitapa -  Interview -  group Enrique Espinoza Work team from the Commission for Free 
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Date Location Activity Name Organization 
Managua Ramiro Blanco 
Norma Aburto 
Zones in Nicaragua. 
February 3 Managua Interview Fernando Malespín Expert on labor issues in the maquila, 
UCA – Nicaragua Professor and Advisor 
to the Labor Minister of Nicaragua. 
February 3 Managua  Interview José Espinoza Navas President of the Confederation of Union 
Unity– CUS - of Nicaragua. 
Secretary General of the Permanent 
Council of Workers of Nicaragua. 
Feb. 3 Managua Material Review Omar Salazar 
Alvarado 
ASEPROLA 
Feb.4 to 8  San José Write interim report Omar Salazar, 
Giovanni Beluche, 
Víctor Quesada 
ASEPROLA 
Feb.10  San José Coordination with 
FLA 
Omar Salazar 
Jorge Pérez 
ASEPROLA 
FLA 
Feb.14 to 
22 
San José Develop Final 
Report 
Omar Salazar 
Giovanni Beluche V 
Carlos Pacheco 
Víctor Quesada 
Daniel Pacheco 
Investigation Team 
 
 
 
 
 
